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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
DAX BRANT HAMMER, : Case No. 960554-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) within 1,000 feet of a public park, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1996) and 58-37-8(5)(a)(v)(ix) 
(1996). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Where the record supports a determination of probable cause to 
search, did the trial court properly refuse to suppress evidence seized during a 
warrant-supported search of defendant's person? 
1 
A magistrate's probable cause determination is given great deference on 
review. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Accord State v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 
1017, 1019 (Utah App. 1993). Therefore, this Court does not conduct a de novo review 
of the magistrate's probable cause determination, but need only determine whether the 
supporting affidavit provided a "substantial basis" for that determination. State v. 
Collard, 810 P.2d 884 (Utah App.), cert denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). Accord 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915 (1984). Accordingly, consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment's strong preference for warrant supported searches, this Court should 
not engage in a hypertechnical, but rather a common sense evaluation of the probable 
cause ruling. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993). 
Here, the trial court did not review the magistrate's probable cause 
determination, opting instead to justify the search of defendant's person as a reasonable 
suspicion-supported probation search. For reasons set forth in the body of the brief, on 
the facts of this case, the trial court's ruling is questionable. This Court may, however, 
affirm the ruling below on the alternative grounds that the search warrant affidavit 
establishes, as a matter of law, probable cause to search. State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 
356 (Utah 1996) (recognizing that "appellate courts may affirm the trial court's decision 
to admit evidence on any proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned another 
reason for its ruling") (quotation omitted)). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTE AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) within 1,000 feet of a public park, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1996) and 58-37-8(5)(a)(v)(ix) 
(1996) and possession of drug paraphernalia within 1,000 feet of public park, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37a-5 (1996) and 58-37-
8(5)(a)(v)(ix) (1996) (R. 1-2). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant-
supported search (R. 20, a copy of the motion to suppress is attached as addendum A). 
Following a suppression hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion in an order 
entered 26 June 1995 (R. 58-61, a copy is attached as addendum B). 
Thereafter, defendant was convicted in a bench trial for possession of 
methamphetamine (R. 104). Count II was dismissed (id). 
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The trial court imposed a one-to-fifteen year term in the Utah State Prison 
and a $10,000 fine, which sentence was then stayed and defendant was placed on a 36 
month probationary term (R. 120-23). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Investigation of Suspected Drug Trafficking 
Based on information that stolen property had been exchanged for 
methamphetamine in the early morning hours of 17 April 1995, at the Adam's residence 
in Santa Clara, Utah, Detective Reynolds of the St. George Police Department prepared a 
search warrant affidavit requesting authorization to search the residence and "all persons 
present" on 18 April 1995 (R. 40, a copy of the search warrant and affidavit is contained 
in addendum C). The affidavit included information from four different sources 
including three confidential informants who observed the stolen property at the Adam's 
residence and/or purchased drugs from individuals associated with the residence (R. 42-
44 (addendum C)). 
Sources Relied Upon 
The first confidential informant in the affidavit contacted the Santa Clara 
City Marshal, Kenneth Campbell, on 17 August 1995, and inquired if Marshal Campbell 
was interested in "putting Ray Adams away" (R. 154). Marshal Campbell asked what the 
informant meant by that and the informant responded that Adams "was in possession of a 
saw that was stolen in Santa Clara that morning" (id.). Specifically, the informant 
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reported that "at about 5:00 that morning Patrick Sparrow and Eric Fox had stolen a saw 
and power cord, and traded them to Ray Adams for an eight ball of methamphetamine" 
(R. 43 (addendum C)). The informant reported seeing a white pickup truck at the scene 
of the theft, and further claimed to have obtained his information "from one of the 
individuals involved in the theft" (id). 
Marshal Campbell was also contacted by Robert Loris, the victim, who 
confirmed the first confidential informant's report. Loris reported that his ten inch radial 
saw and stand, and a 100 foot power cord, had been stolen that morning from a house he 
was building at 3520 Chalet Drive, Santa Clara, Utah (R. 43 (addendum C)). 
Marshal Campbell relayed the above information to Detective Reynolds for 
inclusion in the search warrant affidavit (R. 44 (addendum C)), R. 157). 
Robert Sparrow, who was inculpated by the first confidential informant, 
was also a named source in the affidavit and admitted that he was at the Loris' property 
located at 3250 Chalet Drive, in the early morning hours of 17 April 1995 (R. 43 
(addendum C)). He admitted seeing Loris' saw at that time and to driving a white pick-
up truck (id.). Sparrow also confirmed that Loris' saw was then at the Adams' house, and 
that he purchased and used methamphetamine at the Adams' house on the morning of the 
theft (R. 43-44 (addendum C)). 
Sparrow further stated that he had purchased the methamphetamine from an 
individual named "Rocky," who was often at the Adams' house, along with his girl 
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friend, Darcy (R. 44 (addendum C)). Detective Reynolds recognized Rocky and Darcy as 
individuals involved in drug trafficking in the Washington County area (id). 
Detective Reynolds included in the affidavit, information from a second, 
previously reliable, confidential informant, which he had obtained one month earlier, in 
March 1995 (R. 44 (addendum C)). The second confidential informant reported that 
he/she had observed other individuals using methamphetamine in the Adams' house in 
March, and that Ray Adams' was involved in trafficking "very large quantities of 
methamphetamine and marijuana in the Washington County area" (R. 44 (addendum C)). 
The informant further reported that a large quantity of methamphetamine was delivered to 
the Adams' house during the first week of March 1995 (id.). 
A third confidential informant contacted Detective Reynolds during the last 
part of February 1995, and reported that he/she could and had purchased drugs from Ray 
Adams in the past (id.). According to the informant, Adams' drove to the Dutchman's 
Market in Santa Clara and sold drugs from his car at that location (id.). 
Search Warrant Obtained and Executed 
Based on the above information, on 18 April 1995, Detective Reynolds 
obtained a warrant to search for the radial saw, power cord, methamphetamine and drug 
paraphernalia at the Adams' residence, including all outbuildings and vehicles on the 
premises and all persons present during execution of the warrant (R. 44-42 (addendum 
C), R. 277-78). 
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Defendant was at the house at the time of the search (R. 279). Through a 
partially open door at the bottom of the stairs, Deputy Endter of the Washington County 
Sheriffs Office, saw defendant reach behind a bed (R. 279). Concerned for the officers 
safety, Deputy Endter entered the room and grabbed defendant, placing him on the floor 
(id). Detective Reynolds answered Deputy Endter's call for assistance and handcuffed 
and searched defendant (R. 280, 286). Detective Reynolds found two plastic baggies 
containing methamphetamine in defendant's right front pocket, along with defendant's 
driver's license (R. 288, 290, 343). Upon checking the area behind the bed where 
defendant had put his hand, Deputy Endter found some glass pipes hidden underneath a 
pile of clothing, which pipes had been used to smoke methamphetamine (R. 280). 
Motion to Suppress 
Defendant challenged the seizure of evidence in a motion to suppress, 
alleging that the affidavit failed to establish the first confidential informant's reliability 
and that Paragraph 4(a) contained false information (R. 20 (addendum A)).1 That 
paragraph notes Detective Reynolds' belief that the first confidential informant "is a 
citizen with no motive to fabricate and nothing to gain from providing this information" 
(R. 43 (addendum C), and R. 156). 
1
 Defendant also asserted that paragraph 4(f) contained false information but 
did not further develop the bare allegation in the subsequent suppression hearing. 
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A suppression hearing was held on 18 May 1995 (R. 35-36). The first 
confidential informant was identified at that time as Kelly Lee Moore (R. 154). Prior to 
the time that Moore contacted him regarding the stolen radial saw, Marshal Campbell was 
unacquainted with Moore (R. 154). The Marshal therefore checked on Moore's reliability 
by calling Deputy Humphries of the Washington County Sheriffs Office, whom Moore 
reported as having worked with on two prior cases (R. 163). Deputy Humphries 
confirmed that she had used Moore as an informant and that his information had proved 
reliable in the past (R. 164). 
Marshal Campbell also met with Moore "face-to-face" and asked him "what 
his motive was for coming forward" (R. 157). Moore responded that "he had been 
involved in this situation, that because of the use of narcotics it had ruined his family, it 
had caused a divorce. Basically everything that he had worked for was gone, and he was 
just sick and tired of it and wanted to do something about it" (R. 158). Moore also told 
Marshal Campbell that he was facing an assault charge (R. 160, 162). Marshal Campbell 
asked if Moore expected something in exchange for his information and explained that 
neither he nor anybody else was in a position to offer Moore anything (R. 161). Moore 
reiterated that his motivation for coming forward was the situation "with him and his wife 
and his concerns there" (R. 161). 
Although Marshal Campbell could not recall if he had informed Detective 
Reynolds about Moore's pending assault charge (R. 185,189), Detective Reynolds was 
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unaware that Moore had any pending charges when he prepared the affidavit and deemed 
Moore to be reliable based on the corroboration of his information through another 
informant and because he knew that Moore was trying to get out of the drug culture (R. 
181,184). Marshal Campbell and the prosecutor denied having made any offer of 
leniency to Moore in exchange for his information (R. 161,171,192). 
Defendant also questioned Detective Reynolds concerning the reliability of 
the second and third confidential informants (R. 196). Detective Reynolds described the 
second confidential informant as "previously reliable" (R. 44 (addendum E)), on the 
ground that the informant had made two earlier controlled buys for the St. George Police 
Department (R. 197-200). Detective Reynolds did not include specific reliability 
information regarding the third confidential informant in the affidavit, as none was 
available at that time (R. 201). 
Defendant subpoenaed informant Moore, but he failed to appear (R. 194, 
202-04). Due to that failure, the trial court considered other justifications for the search 
of defendant's person, which would not require it to consider the validity of the search 
warrant affidavit (R. 174-75). To that end, the trial court took judicial notice of the fact 
that defendant was on probation at the time the search was conducted: 
[T]he record needs to reflect that the Court is taking judicial 
notice of my other file on [defendant] under which I placed 
[defendant] on probation and ordered that [defendant] be 
subject to search by a probation officer without the necessity 
of a warrant or by any peace officer having reasonable 
9 
suspicion that he was violating the Court's probation order 
without the necessity of a warrant. 
(R. 175). 
The trial court then inquired whether the search was not justifiable on the 
alternative ground that it was supported by reasonable suspicion (R. 175-76). Trial 
counsel responded that in his view, police lacked reasonable suspicion to search 
defendant, and that under the probation agreement, only probation officers can conduct 
warrantless, reasonable suspicion searches of probationers, and that the probation order 
"[did] not extend to any peace officer in the community" (R. 177-79). Additionally, in 
the course of the hearing, trial counsel elicited information from Detective Reynolds that 
Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) had not directed that the search be performed, nor 
had any probation officer participated in the execution of the search warrant (R. 201). 
The matter was continued for hearings on 26 May 1995 (R. 211-56), and 31 
May 1995 (R. 257-71), wherein the parties and court continued to discuss defendant's 
probationary status as an alternative justification for the search (id). Trial counsel also 
introduced defendant's signed probation agreement which stated that defendant would 
"permit agents of Adult Parole and Probation to search [his] person, residence, or vehicle 
or any other property under [his] control without a warrant at any time, day or night, upon 
reasonable suspicion" (R. 258). 
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Ruling 
At the conclusion of the 31 May 1995 hearing, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion to suppress (R. 266-70), which ruling was reduced to formal findings 
and conclusions (R. 58-61 (addendum B)). In so ruling, the trial court reiterated its belief 
that it was unable to determine Moore's reliability, "other than by reference to other 
information in the affidavit" (R. 59 (addendum B)). Therefore, because the trial court 
believed that the search could be "sustained on the basis of the defendant's probationary 
status/' it declined to determine whether the search warrant properly authorized the 
search (id). Rather, the trial court found that: 
1. Defendant was previously convicted of Attempted Burglary, a 
third degree felony, in Washington County Criminal No. 
951500040 FS, and the court, sua sponte, takes judicial notice 
of those prior proceedings. 
2. Defendant was sentenced on the Attempted Burglary 
conviction on March 29, 1995, during which proceeding, the 
district court specifically stated and included as a condition of 
probation that the defendant submit his person, possessions, 
and residence to search at the request of a probation officer at 
any time and to search by any peace officer upon reasonable 
suspicion. 
3. The judgment, sentence, and order of probation in that case 
was not signed until May 16,1995. It was entered as part of 
the court record on May 25, 1995. 
4. Pursuant to that judgment, sentence, and order of probation 
the defendant signed a standard form Probation Agreement on 
April 10,1995, which agreement includes the following 
language: 
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SEARCHES: I will permit Agents of Adult 
Probation and Parole to search my PERSON, 
RESIDENCE, VEHICLE, or any other property 
under my control, without a warrant, at any 
time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion to 
ensure compliance with the conditions of my 
Probation Agreement. 
That agreement also contains the following 
language which is typed in as part of paragraph 
11 ("SPECIAL CONDITIONS"): "D. Submit to 
random tests of breath and bodily fluids, and 
random searches of person and property." 
5. The subject search was conducted by peace officers on April 18, 
1995. 
6. Probation officers were not involved in conducting the search and 
did not request that the search be conducted. 
7. Even if circumstances involving Mr. Moore's difficulties with the 
law are factored into the equation, the affidavit for the search warrant 
. . . is sufficient to and does establish "reasonable suspicion" on the 
part of law enforcement officers to believe that [defendant], by virtue 
of his presence on the subject premises, was in possession of 
controlled substances, specifically methamphetamine. 
(R. 59-60 (addendum B)). 
Based on the above, the trial court concluded that the condition of 
defendant's probation requiring him to submit to search by peace officers upon 
reasonable suspicion was a valid and enforceable condition; and that defendant was 
required to submit to the instant search "as there was reasonable suspicion to support the 
search" (R. 61 (addendum B)). 
12 
SUMMARY OF THF ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm the trial court's ruling suppressing evidence seized 
below. Although the trial court's reliance upon defendant's probationary status as a 
justification for the instant search is, on these facts, questionable, the search is otherwise 
justifiable. Indeed, the record before the court is adequate to demonstrate, as a matter of 
law, the reliability of the information set forth in the search warrant affidavit. Even if 
information obtained from the challenged confidential informant, Kelly Lee Moore, is 
excised, the affidavit still provides a substantial basis for the magistrate's probable cause 
determination. Consequently, the search is justifiable on this alternative ground, and the 
Court should affirm the ruling below. 
ARGUMENT 
ON THESE FACTS, THE TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE 
ON DEFENDANT'S PROBATIONARY STATUS AS AN 
AD HOC JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SEARCH IS 
QUESTIONABLE; HOWEVER, THE COURT NEED 
NOT REACH THAT ISSUE BECAUSE THE SEARCH 
WARRANT CONSTITUTES A VIABLE, 
ALTERNATIVE GROUND FOR AFFIRMANCE 2 
Due to perceived difficulties in establishing the reliability of one of three 
confidential informants relied upon in the search warrant affidavit, and finding that 
despite this difficulty the affidavit established at least reasonable suspicion to search, the 
2
 As defendant disavows any separate analysis under Article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution, Br. of Aplt. at 2 n.l, the State's merits analysis proceeds solely 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
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trial court opted to uphold the instant search based solely on defendant's status as a 
probationer (R. 58-61 (addendum B)). See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 
(1987) (upholding warrantless, reasonable suspicion-supported search of probationer); 
State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1983) (same in parole context). See also 
State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209-10 (Utah App. 1991) (extending the Velasquez 
reasonable suspicion requirement to searches of probationers, whose liberty interests are 
limited to the same degree as those of parolees). While the above authority certainly 
supports the view that probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy which 
permits the State to impinge upon their privacy to a degree that would not be 
constitutional if applied to the public at large, that permissible degree of impingement is 
not unlimited. Griffin, 438 U.S. at 875; Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1262. 
Indeed, Velasquez emphasizes the limited nature of the reasonable 
suspicion-supported search rule for parolees, holding that such searches can be justified 
only 'to the extent actually necessitated by the legitimate demands of the operation of the 
parole process.9" 672 P.2d at 1263. Otherwise, the Court feared that such searches 
"would practically gut the principle that parolees are entitled to some privacy." Id. See 
also State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069,1072 n.2 (Utah 1987) (holding that Court will not 
tolerate "unlimited complicity" between parole officers and police to avoid the warrant 
requirement, and that it will invalidate a parole search "if the parole officer acts merely as 
an agent or tool of the police). On the narrow facts of this case, where Adult Probation 
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and Parole agents neither instigated, nor participated in the search, and where the record 
is devoid of indication that police were otherwise alerted to defendant's probationary 
status at the time of the warrant-supported search, the trial court's ruling is questionable. 
However, the Court need not address that issue because the search warrant affidavit 
provides a substantial basis for the magistrate's probable cause determination and, 
therefore, constitutes a viable, alternative basis for affirmance. State v. South, 924 P.2d 
354, 356 (Utah 1996) (recognizing that "appellate courts may affirm the trial court's 
decision to admit evidence on any proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned 
another reason for its ruling") (quotation omitted)). 
The magistrate's probable cause determination and issuance of the search 
warrant should be upheld.3 The trial court declined to pass upon the validity of the search 
warrant affidavit when it encountered difficulties haling Moore, one of three confidential 
informants relied upon in the search warrant affidavit, into court for questioning by 
defendant (R. 58-59 (addendum B)). Defendant alleged that Moore had received 
assistance from police regarding his pending assault charge, in exchange for information 
inculpating three other suspects in a drugs-for-contraband scheme (R. 171). 
Consequently, defendant argued that the affidavit erroneously described Moore as having 
3
 The trial court found defendant had standing, under the all persons clause of 
the warrant, to contest the magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to 
believe that evidence of stolen property and continuous drug trafficking would be located 
at the Adams' residence and/or premises (R. 176). 
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no motive to fabricate and nothing to gain (R. 174). The trial court erroneously viewed 
these allegations as unresolvable without Moore's presence (R. 59 (addendum B)). For 
reasons set forth below, the search warrant affidavit nonetheless established a substantial 
basis for the magistrate's probable cause determination. 
First, Marshal Campbell and the prosecutor both denied that Moore had 
been offered anything in exchange for his information (R. 161, 171, 192). Moreover, 
Detective Reynold's was unaware Moore had a pending assault charge at the time the 
affidavit was drafted (R. 181, 184). Rather, Detective Reynolds deemed Moore reliable 
based on the corroboration of his information and because he knew that Moore was trying 
to get out of the drug culture (id). Even assuming that Moore had testified, and that his 
testimony was favorable to defendant's claim, it would have been against the clear weight 
of the evidence, and by itself, inadequate to demonstrate any falsity in the affidavit. 
Detective Reynolds simply had no basis upon which to believe that Moore had been 
offered a deal. Therefore his characterizations of Moore as lacking any improper motive 
and having nothing to gain do not rise to the level of knowing, intentional, or even 
reckless false statements. See State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1985) 
(recognizing that minor discrepancies in an affidavit did not rise to the level of 
knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly making a false statement and therefore did not 
undermine the essential truth of the allegations therein). Compare State v. Nielson, 727 
P.2d 188,189 (Utah 1986) (holding that affiant's intentional and bad faith misstatements 
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"did not materially affect the magistrate's finding of probable cause; therefore, the 
warrant must be sustained as a matter of federal law."). 
Second, assuming even further that Moore had an improper motive in 
providing the information to Marshal Campbell, the reliability of his information is 
adequately set forth within the affidavit. An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of 
knowledge are factors to be considered in determining whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, probable cause exists. State v. Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah App. 
1993); State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992). However, "[t]hey are not 
strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly extracted' in every case." State v. Hansen, 
132 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)). 
Their significance varies under the circumstances of each search. Singleton, 854 P.2d at 
1020; Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Where, as here, the circumstances as a whole demonstrate 
the truthfulness of the Moore's report, a less strong showing is required. Id. Indeed, 
courts have consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the informant's 
knowledge is based on personal observation, and/or the informant's reliability is manifest 
in the detail of his report, independently corroborated, id., or the informant has provided 
reliable information on prior occasions. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; State v. Anderson, 701 
P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985); State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258,1260 (Utah 1983) (all indicating that an informant that has 
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previously provided truthful information is an accepted method for establishing veracity). 
All of these considerations apply here. 
Here, Moore's information was subsequently, independently corroborated 
by the victim, Robert Loris, by one of the suspects, Patrick Sparrow, and by two 
additional confidential informants (R. 40-45 (addendum C)). Moreover, Moore's 
information was detailed, including such specifics as the time of his observation, the 
identity of the suspects, a description of their truck and the property stolen, the current 
location of that property, and that the property had been exchanged for an eight ball of 
methamphetamine (R. 43 (addendum C)). Additionally, to the extent defendant was able 
to look beyond the affidavit at the suppression hearing, he learned that Moore had also 
proven reliable in two previous cases (R. 164). In light of these facts, defendant's claims 
that Moore had an improper motive detract little, if any, from the reliability of the 
information Moore provided. 
Finally, even assuming Moore's information was unreliable, the trial court 
could have excised that information and the affidavit would still establish a substantial 
basis for the magistrate's probable cause determination. Specifically, Patrick Sparrow 
acknowledged being at Loris' property on the morning of the theft, and at the Adams' 
residence thereafter. He further acknowledged that Loris' saw was then at the Adams' 
residence and that he had purchased and used methamphetamine while at the Adams' 
residence on the morning of the theft (R. 43-44 (addendum C)). Sparrows' information is 
18 
reliable because it is based on his personal knowledge and observation. Singleton, 854 
P.2d at 1020; Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Additionally, it is incriminating information. 
Such information is not lightly placed into the hands of police. United States v. Dozier, 
844 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that arrested person "do not lightly admit a 
crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their 
admissions" and that "[e]ven when an informant is promised . . . a 'break' there remains 
the 'residual risk and opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct'") (quoting United 
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971)). Consequently, Sparrows' information by 
itself justifies issuance of a search warrant. 
But Sparrows' admissions are not all that police relied upon here. They 
also had consistent information from the second and third confidential informants, who 
both reported that Ray Adams was involved in on-going drug trafficking as recently as 
February and March 1995 (R. 44-45 (addendum C)). The reports of the second and third 
confidential informants' are reliable because they too are based on their personal 
observation and knowledge, as well as being consistent with Sparrows9 admissions. 
Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1020; Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Moreover, the third informant, like 
Sparrows, provided incriminating information, admitting he/she had and could purchase 
drugs from Adams (R. 44 (addendum C)). See Dozier, 844 F.2d at 707. Because 
Sparrows and two additional, confidential informants (not including Moore) supplied 
mutually reinforcing and corroborative information, that information is reliable. United 
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States v. Hyde, 51A F.2d 856, 863 (5th Cir. 1978) ("When three unreliable but 
unconnected persons all report the same fact, it is probable that the fact is true.")- See 
also Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1020 (noting that informant's first-hand information of drug 
sales was "verified and bolstered by three other confidential informants"). 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, and even excising Moore's 
information, the affidavit establishes, as a matter of law, a substantial basis upon which to 
believe that stolen property, drugs and drug paraphernalia, as well as individuals involved 
in these illicit activities would be located at the Adams' residence and/or premises. This 
Court should affirm the magistrate's probable cause determination. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should uphold the warrant-supported 
search of defendant's person, and on this alternative basis, affirm the trial court's 
admission of the evidence below. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on JL August 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 




assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on /'August 1997,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
GARY W. PENDLETON 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 




GARY W. PENDLETON (2564) 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Ph: (801) 628-4411 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DAX BRANT HAMMER, ] 
Defendant. ) 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
) Case No. 951500444 FS 
Defendant, by and through his attorney, Gary W. Pendleton, hereby moves the 
court for an order suppressing any and all evidence seized or obtained as the result of the 
search of the residence located at 1185 North Santa Clara Parkway in Santa Clara, Utah, 
on April 18,1995. This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that the warrant 
supporting the search was issued without probable cause in that the credibility of the 
confidential informant identified in paragraph 4(a) of the affidavit supporting the search 
warrant was established by means of false information provided by police officers. 
Furthermore, the information contained in paragraph 4(f) of the affidavit is false. Once the 
inaccurate information is extracted from the application for the search warrant, the affidavit 
is insufficient to establish probable cause. Furthermore, the government caimot rely upon 
<< 
the Leon good faith exception where material parts of the application were false and 
misleading and known by the police to be the same. 
**-> 
DATED this <— O 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this P & day of April 1995, I did personally 
deliver a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document to Eric Ludlow, 




GARY W. PENDLETON (2564) 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Ph: (801) 628-4411 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DAX BRANT HAMMER, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, 
AND ORDER DENYING MOTION 
) TO SUPPRESS 
) Case No. 951500444 
I Judge James L Shumate 
This matter came on for further hearing following an evidentiary hearing which 
was conducted on defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of the 
defendant's person which search was conducted on or about April 18,1995. In the course 
of the proceedings on the motion to suppress, defendant has been unable to procure the 
compulsory attendance of one Kelly Moore who has now been identified by law enforcement 
officers as an undisclosed informant in the application for the search warrant under which 
the subject search was initiated. There are presently outstanding warrants for Mr. Moore's 
arrest not only in this proceeding but also in at least one criminal proceeding in which he 
is a defendant. 
-yC 
1 
The court specifically finds that given the information which has come to light 
regarding Mr. Moore's difficulties with law enforcement prior to the application for the 
search warrant, the court is disinclined to rely upon that portion of the search warrant which 
identifies Moore as "a citizen with no motive to fabricate and nothing to gain from providing 
this information.11 Accordingly, the court is without information by which the reliability of 
this undisclosed informant could be established other than by reference to other information 
in the affidavit. 
However, if the search can be sustained on the basis of the defendant's 
probationary status, it is not necessary for the court to determine whether or not the search 
warrant was properly issued or whether or not it properly authorized the search of "all 
persons present during execution of the search warrant". The court, therefore, considers the 
issue of whether or not the defendant's probationary status rendered him subject to 
warrantless searches by peace officers based upon reasonable suspicion. In concluding that 
it does, the court specifically makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was previously convicted of Attempted Burglary, a third degree 
felony, in Washington County Criminal No. 951500040 FS, and the court, gua sponte. takes 
judicial notice of those prior proceedings. 
2. Defendant was sentenced on the Attempted Burglary conviction on March 
29, 1995, during which proceeding, the district court specifically stated and included as a 
condition of probation that the defendant submit his person, possessions, and residence to 
2 
search at the request of a probation officer at any time and to search by any peace officer 
upon reasonable suspicion. 
3. The judgment, sentence, and order of probation in that case was not signed 
until May 16, 1995. It was entered as part of the court record on May 25, 1995. 
4. Pursuant to that judgment, sentence, and order of probation the defendant 
signed a standard form Probation Agreement on April 10,1995, which agreement includes 
the following language: 
6. SEARCHES: I will permit Agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search 
my PERSON, RESIDENCE, VEHICLE or any other property under my 
control, without a warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable 
suspicion to ensure compliance with the conditions of my Probation 
Agreement. 
That agreement also contains the following language which is typed in 
as part of paragraph 11 ("SPECIAL CONDITIONS"): **D. Submit to 
random tests of breath and bodily fluids, and random searches of 
person and property." 
5. The subject search was conducted by peace officers on April 18, 1995. 
6. Probation officers were not involved in conducting the search and did not 
request that the search be conducted. 
7. Even if the circumstances involving Mr. Moore's difficulties with the law are 
factored into the equation, the affidavit for the search warrant, a copy of which is attached 
hereto, is sufficient to and does establish "reasonable suspicion** on the part of law 
enforcement officers to believe that Mr. Hammer, by virtue of his presence on the subject 
premises, was in possession of controlled substances, specifically methamphetamine. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes upon the following: 
3 
INCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant was under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
Washington County. 
2. The condition of his probation requiring the defendant submit his person 
and residence to search by peace ofBcers upon reasonable suspicion is a valid and 
enforceable term of the defendant's probation. 
3. The defendant was required to submit to the subject search as there was 
reasonable suspicion to support the search. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that 
defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence obtained in the search of the defendant's 
person is overruled and denied on the basis that the defendant was subject to warrantless 
search conducted by peace officers upon reasonable suspicion. - , / \ 
DATED this 2 _? day of June,. 1995 





IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) SEARCH WARRANT 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
IN THE MATTER OF A ) Criminal No. 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: 
Probable cause appearing from the Affidavit in Support of 
Search Warranty filed herewith; 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to make an immediate search of the 
following: residence located at 1185 North Santa Clara Parkway, 
Santa Clara, Utah, including all outbuildings, all vehicles on 
the premises, as well as all persons present during execution of 
the search warrant. 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to search for: One 10 inch radial 
arm saw and stand, and one 100 foot power cord bank. Also 
methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia (see exhibit C) . 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to hold any property seized 
subject to further order of this Court. This warrant should be 
executed as soon as practicable, and is void after 10 days if not 
served. A verified RETURN and INVENTORY of property seized must 
be made promptly to the Court. 
This warrant must be executed during daylight hours, after 
2 DEFENDANT'S v 
EXHIBIT * 
u
 J x^gj^^^^ 
giving notice of authority and purpose, unless special authority 
is granted below. 
_ V You are authorized to search DAY or NIGHT. 
—r— ic You are authorized to search WITHOUT NOTICE. 
Date /,C' fyrtr Time / ] ' 2j 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 






AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
SEARCH WARRANT 
Criminal No. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
The AffiaPt undersigned, Mike Reynolds, appearing personally 
before me and having been sworn, States on oath: 
(1) "That I am employed by the St. George City Police 
Department as "a law enforcement officer, and I am assigned to 
investigate narcotics violations in Washington County, 
(2) The items for which a search warrant is sought are 
described as follows: One 10 inch radial arm saw and stand, and 
one 100 foot power cord bank. Also methamphetamine, and drug 
paraphernalia (see exhibit C)• 
(3) These items are believed to be located at or in: 
residence located at 1185 North Santa Clara Parkway, Santa Clara, 
Utah, including all outbuildings, all vehicles on the premises, 
as veil as all persons present during execution of the search 
warrant. 
(4) The grounds for issuing a search warrant are as 
follows: 
a. On April 18, 1995, I received information from Santa 




received information from a confidential informant that at about 
5:00 that morning, Patrick Sparrow and Eric Fox had stolen a saw 
and power cord, and traded them to kay Adams for an eight ball of 
methamphetamine. The informant stated that he received this 
information from one of the individuals involved in the theft. 
The informant is a citizen with no motive to fabricate and 
nothing to gain from providing this information. 
b. Marshall Campbell was also advised on April 17, by 
Robert Loris, that a ten inch radial arm saw and stand, and a 100 
foot power cord bank belonging to Mr. Loris had been stolen from 
a house Mr. Loris is building at 3 52 0 Chalet Drive, in Santa 
Clara. 
c. The informant also advised Marshall Campbeil that he 
observed a white pickup truck at the job site early in the 
morning on April 17, 1995. 
d. On April 18, 1995, I interviewed Patrick Sparrow, after 
first advising him of his Miranda rights. Mr. Sparrow stated 
that he was at 3520 Chalet Drive, in Santa Clara, picking"up 
scrap lumber in the early morning hours of April 17, and he 
observed the above-described saw. Mr. Sparrow stated that he was 
driving a white pickup truck. 
e. Mr. Sparrow further advised your affiant that the above-
described saw is at the residence of Ray Adams, 1185 North Santa 
Clara Parkway, Santa Clara, Utah. 
f. Mr. Sparrow also stated that he used methamphetamine at 
Ray Adams1 residence in the early morning hours of April 17. Mr. 
2 
Sparrow stated that he purchased one quarter gram of 
methamphetamine from an individual named "Rocky11 at the 
residence. 
g. Mr. Sparrow stated that "Rocky" is often at the 
residence, as well as a female named "Darcy," unknown last name, 
who Mr. Sparrow believes has been in trouble in the past for drug 
use. Your affiant is aware of individuals by the names of Rocky 
and Darcy who are involved in the drug culture in St. George. 
h. In March, 1995, a confidential informant who has proved 
to be reliable previously, told your affiant that Ray Adams was 
distributing very large quantities of methamphetamine and 
marijuana in the Washington County area, and that the informant 
had seen methamphetamine in the residence during the month of 
March. The informant also observed individuals at the residence 
using methamphetamine. The informant knew of a large quantity of 
methamphetamine that was being delivered to Ray Adams during the 
first week of Mardbu 
i. During the last part of February, 1995, your affiant was 
contacted by a different confidential informant who advised that 
he/she could purchase drugs from Ray Adams, and had purchased 
drugs from Ray Adams in the past. This individual stated that 
Ray Adams would drive his vehicle to the Dutchman's Market in 
Santa Clara and sell the drugs from his vehicle. 
(5) Your affiant has probable cause to believe, and does 
believe, that the above-described evidence will be located at or 
in the above-described location, and that it could be easily 
3 
removed, concealed, damaged or destroyed, and asks for authority 
to search without notice. 
(6) Your affiant believes the foregoing information 
constitutes probable cause to support a search of the garage at 
the above residence, and seizure of the above-described evidence. 
Dated t4-K-q< Time /7.ZT jflfe 
JfatriL*. 
MIKE "REYNOLDS / 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /o day of April, 
1995. 
4 




1. Methamphetamine, a crystalline white or yellowish powder 
solid or rock form, a controlled substance. 
2. Packaging material, to include, but not limited to scales, 
plastic bags, tape, paper bindles cut into squares or tin 
foi1 sections . 
3. Drug paraphernalia to include but not limited to syringes, 
bent spoon, cotton balls, mirrors, razor blades, srtraws, 
pipes, glassware used to produce "crank* a form of 
methamphetamine and of any cut material or precursor 
chemical• 
4. Residency papers to include, but not limited to utility 
receipts and or bills, rental/lease agreements and articles 
showing occupancy of the premises on ownership of premises 
or automobiles. 
5. U.S. Currency believed to be in close proximity to the 
narcotics or produced from the sale of narcotics being 
searched for. 
6» Narcotic recordation, to include but not limited to price 
list, amounts sold, times, dates, amounts purchased, and 
especially drug indebtness. 
7. Telephonic equipment to include but not limited to cordless 
phones, mobile phones, audio or digital pager devices used 
to communicate for the purpose of a related unlawful 
activity. 
